After on-going rumors of John Farrell making a return to Beantown, it’s finally a done deal.  The former Sox pitching coach has agreed to a 4 year contract to manage at Fenway Park.  Since his contract with the Toronto Blue Jays is expiring next offseason, the Jays received shortstop Mike Aviles as compensation from Boston. 

       Farrell led the Blue Jays to a subpar 154-170 mark in his two seasons north of the border.  They also finished 8 games worse in 2012 than in 2011.  The Blue Jays willingness to negotiate with Boston signals they are ready to move on without Farrell being a part of their future plans.  Also, Farrell’s inclination to speak directly with Ben Cherington and the Red Sox about the position showed his desire to return to Boston.  It seems like a good fit, as Farrell has a great relationship with Ben Cheringtion after having a shaky partnership with Alex Anthopoulos.  Farrell had a history of being in disagreement with the Toronto GM with some of his roster moves.  Farrell was pushing to release veteran infielder Omar Vizquel in July and the Jays disagreed and kept him.  Farrell also called for help in the starting rotation and instead the Jays got bullpen help at the trade deadline.   These incidents did not escalate enough to receive the kind of attention and scrutiny Bobby Valentine faced in Boston.  Valentine had problems throughout the year with his players and the media which made it inevitable that he would be out as manager.  Comparing Farrell and Valentine’s managerial style, the Red Sox are receiving a more aggressive manager, with Farrell’s Jays attempting 164 stolen bases compared to the Red Sox’ 128 in 2012.  However, they both sacrificed almost the same amount of time with Farrell bunting 33 times compared to Valentine’s 34. 

                It is clear the glaring problem on Yawkey Way is the pitching staff.  As a staff, Red Sox pitchers posted the third worst ERA in the American League (4.72) in 2012.  Leaders of the staff such as Josh Beckett, Jon Lester and Clay Buchholz also fell apart in 2012.  With Beckett now in Los Angeles, Lester and Buchholz look to anchor the rotation yet again as they attempt to return to front-line starters.  Farrell is the optimal guy for Boston as he led his pitchers to great success during his time as pitching coach.  From 2007-2010 (Farrell era), Red Sox pitchers led the American League in strikeouts, opponent batting average, and shutouts.  They also ranked third in ERA during Farrell’s 4 year stint (4.11).  It may be coincidental, but Jon Lester is a perfect example of a guy who just seemed more comfortable with Farrell’s presence.  After winning the clinching game of the 2007 World Series in Colorado, Lester went on to post an ERA+ of 144, 136 and 134 from 2008-2010 under Farrell.  At this point, Jon entered 2011 at age 26, so it would make sense to expect similar results if not much better results.  However, after a nice start to 2011, Lester completely fell apart in September (the worst and most painful month in Red Sox history I might add) and has not been the same since.  He posted an ERA+ of 124 in 2011 and 90 in 2012.  90! Red Sox fans hope Farrell can help him become more comfortable again and aid him in regaining his confidence.  John is also liked around Boston because he coached under Terry Francona, who led the Red Sox to 5 postseason appearances and 2 World Series titles in his 8 year reign. 

       The other part of this deal that hasn’t received much attention is Mike Aviles.  The Jays are getting an average hitter (.277 career BA) who broke out in terms of power in 2012 with a career high 13 home runs.  However, the knock on Aviles is his lack of plate discipline.  He walked just 23 times in 546 plate appearances in 2012 and had a sub-.300 on-base percentage.  This also opens up a hole a shortstop for Boston.  The options they now have internally are Jose Iglesias and Pedro Ciriaco.  Iglesias, a magician with the glove, hasn’t shown any signs of hitting at the big league level (career .135/.210/.413 slash line).  Ciriaco hit for a nice average in 2012 (.293) although he plummeted towards the end of the year.  His .352 BABIP may have had something to do with that, along with swinging at a ton of pitches out of the zone.  He walked just 2.9% of the time he stepped up to the plate.  For now, all signs point to Iglesias being the front runner as Boston's starting shortstop.

First Impressions:

Winners: Red Sox and Blue Jays

                The Red Sox were able to grab the guy they had an eye on for 2 years now.  He is very well respected in Boston by players, management and fans as he enjoyed success as the pitching coach from 2007-2010.  Also, the Sox only had to give up shortstop Mike Aviles.  This is a position where the Red Sox have other options for going forward.

                The Blue Jays were able to get rid of a manager who had not had success and caused a few minor problems with management.  At the same time, they received a solid infielder in Aviles.  The Blue Jays, after coming off a tough season, can now start fresh with a new manager and perhaps change the atmosphere just like Boston is trying to do.  

       Saturday afternoon brought the first hot stove news of the year, as the Athletics, Marlins, and Diamondbacks completed a trade highlighting former All-Stars closer Heath Bell and outfielder Chris Young. The details of the trade are as follows: the Arizona Diamondbacks acquire Heath Bell, shortstop Cliff Pennington (from the A's) and $8,000,000 (from the Marlins); the Miami Marlins acquire minor league infielder Yordy Cabrera (from the A's); and the Oakland Athletics acquire outfielder Chris Young and $500,000 (both from the Diamondbacks).

            The trade finalized Bell's short and tumultuous tenure while in South Beach, only one year after signing a three year $27 million contract for the new look Marlins. He struggled mightily, including being replaced as closer, and completed the season with an unsightly 5.09 ERA and 8 blown saves (second most in league). Off the field, Bell had a complicated relationship with manager Ozzie Guillen, whom he openly criticized for not re-inserting him as closer. Ironically, before completing this trade for the disgruntled closer, the Diamondbacks exercised current closer JJ Putz's option for next year. All indications from the Diamondbacks front office is that Bell will be used as a set up man to Putz. However, which Bell are the Diamondbacks getting? The San Diego relief ace, who from 2009-2011 had a 2.36 ERA, 132 saves, and 9.6 K/9, or the pitcher who was a complete disaster in Miami? Arizona general manager Kevin Towers is banking that Bell's .340 BABIP and HR/FB rate to regress to his career norms, despite peripherals (declining BB and K rates, increasing line drive %) that say otherwise. At this point, Bell's most realistic prognostication would be as a solid middle reliever, one who just happens to be very overpaid. Personally, this would not be a trade I would consider making, given the Diamondbacks' current state, where that money could be redirecting to more dire needs (infield).

            As for the other big name involved, outfielder Chris Young is headed to Oakland after an injury plagued season in the desert. Young hit .231/.311/.434 this past season while battling shoulder and quadriceps injuries throughout the season. Young was part of the young, talented core of players that helped lead the Diamondbacks to a National League West Division title in 2011, but has seen his numbers steadily decline over the past several seasons. His OBP, HR, SLG, SB, and WAR are all heading in the wrong direction and the move to the less hitter-friendly Oakland Coliseum will further depress his offensive numbers. Additionally, Young is set to make $8.5 million in 2013 with an $11 million club option for 2014. This allows Beane to dump Young after one year if he does not perform, and if he does, Beane can retain him for a decent price. Also, it is not completely unfathomable for Young to return to his 2010 numbers (.257/.341/.452 with 27 HR and 91 RBI) considering he will be 29 and should have another 2-3 years in his prime. Yet, with current outfielders Yoenis Cespedes, Josh Reddick, Coco Crisp, and Seth Smith already slated for starting spots, it is puzzling to figure where Young fits in, if at all (perhaps another trade?). But then again, if anyone knows what he is doing, its "Moneyball" genius Billy Beane.

            Lastly, the prospect moving to Miami is 22 year old shortstop, Yordy Cabrera. The Lakeland, Florida native hit .232/.292/.332 while being old for his high-A competition. Cabrera was the 15th best prospect in the A's system according to Baseball America, with above average power potential (despite lackluster HR totals). Defensively, he has flashed occasional brilliance, but still struggles with routine plays and needs further development on his footwork and fundamentals. However, scouts believe his body will continue to grow and a move to third base is likely in the future. For now, he is likely headed to the Marlins high-A affiliate Jupiter to further refine his offensive and defensive skills.

First Impressions

Winners: Marlins, A's. Marlins dumped an unhappy reliever and freed up cash while the A's acquired a good outfielder without giving up much in return. Athletics could also ship Young to receive a player who better fits their needs.

Losers: Diamondbacks. Acquired a middle reliever with an unreasonable contract. Cliff Pennington offers decent middle infield depth, but probably should not be starting for any team, let alone one with playoff aspirations.

      As evidenced by the predictions on the homepage, the Cincinnati Reds were my pick to win the World Series. Lead by a strong staff, excellent bullpen, I expected the offense to hit enough to claim baseball's most coveted title: World Series Champion. After all, former league MVP Joey Votto was now healthy after missing nearly a month with an injured knee, as well as veteran Scott Rolen. Overall, the Reds seemed poised to make a postseason run with its impressive collection of  talent. Just by reviewing the past several world series winners, one would notice that strong bullpens were prevalent in the successes of the '08 Phillies (3.22 ERA), '10 Giants (2.99 ERA), and '11 Cardinals (3.31 postseason ERA). The Reds' pen had the best run per game ratio (3.63) and had the lowest rate of letting inherited runners score (23%). Closer Aroldis Chapman himself put up crazy numbers (15.32 K/9, 1.51 ERA, 1.55 FIP). Just by looking at historical precedent, as well as the current state of the bullpen, in my opinion this advantage would be instrumental in prolonging the Reds' October survival. In addition to one of the best pens in baseball, the Reds rotation was also among the tops in the league. Cy Young candidate Johnny Cueto (2.78 ERA, 152 ERA+), acquired ace Mat Latos (3.48 ERA, 122 ERA+), and Homer Bailey (Sept. 28 no-hitter, 115 ERA+), all aided a deep staff capable of withstanding the October grind. After finishing the season with the second best record in baseball (97 wins), all signs pointed to playoff success for the Cincinnati Reds…

            The first two games in San Francisco for the National League Divisional Series were nothing but complete domination from a team evoking memories of the mid-70's Big Red Machine Dynasty. A 5-2 victory over Giants ace Matt Cain in Game One, followed by a Game Two 9-0 drubbing over southpaw Madison Bumgarner set the tone early and seeming as if it was a foregone conclusion that the NLCS would stop in Cincy. Besides, the Reds had the next three games at home, and there was no way they could blow a 2-0 series lead while at home, right? However, in the games that followed, the Reds exhibited specific flaws, flaws that would prove fatal to their season. Game Three provided a differing quality of game in that the pitching that carried each team was on full display. The game was a 1-1 stalemate until a crucial Scott Rolen error in the 10th allowed the game winning run to score. For good measure, the research of Fangraphs Jeff Sullivan showed that the Giants offensive performance that night was the worst ever for a winner in the postseason. Game Four involved a poor showing by Cincinnati emergency starter Mike Leake and its usually strong bullpen that was finalized with a score of 8-3. Lastly, in the deciding Game Five, Reds' starter Mat Latos gave up six runs in the 5th inning, culminating in a grand slam by potential MVP Buster Posey. The Reds were unable to catch the red-hot Giants, as their season ended that day with a 6-4 loss. So how could a team surrender such a major series advantage to a team seemingly devoid of any momentum?

            First off, let's look at the major reasons as to why they did not win those games as simply as possible. Game 3 was because of an untimely error and poor hitting, Game 4 was because of poor pitching and poor hitting, and Game 5 was because of poor pitching (which was essentially one bad inning). Now, it seems a theme here is uncharacteristic pitching and inconsistent hitting. Yet, when looking at the overall numbers for the series, the Reds pitching was better (3.13 ERA/32 Hits/1.04 WHIP vs. SF's 4.11/47/1.35) and the Reds offense was better (.261/.327/.389 vs. SF's .194/.266/.339 triple slash).  Yet, the key to the Reds collapse was its inability to capitalize with runners on base. In Games 3-5, the Reds batted .125 with 28 runners left on base while the Giants batted .250 with only 14 runners left on base. Just because the Reds had better overall numbers, its failure to drive in runs with players on base was its undoing. Additionally, losing Johnny Cueto in Game 1 due to back issues, ultimately forced the Reds regular season fifth starter, Mike Leake, to throw Game Four. By having Cueto (2.78 ERA, 3.27 FIP) in the game instead of Leake (4.58 ERA, 4.42 FIP) , the Reds lost its best pitcher at arguably the worst possible time. Lastly, key errors by Scott Rolen and rookie Zack Cozart had great impact in the final results of the game. Rolen's Game Three error resulted in a 32% win probability increase for the Giants, the single most influential moment of the game (according to WPA). Cozart's Game Five error only had a 6% WPA for the Giants but allowed a run to score and prevented the Reds from getting a key second out of the inning.

            So how can the Reds improve its team for 2013? They are not a whole lot of glaring weaknesses for a team that won 97 games but the most evident flaw is low on base percentage toward the top of the order. Shortstop Zack Cozart and outfielder Drew Stubbs both had sub .301 OBPs, numbers which are unacceptable when potent hitters such as Joey Votto,  Jay Bruce, and Ryan Ludwick are unable to drive in runners since no runners are on base. By implementing a steady source of OBP production, more opportunities to drive in runs should arise, even if the team had a runner in scoring position problem during the postseason. Possible free agent solutions include Giants outfielder Angel Pagan (.338 OBP) and Michael Bourn (.348 OBP). Also, other than perhaps replacing Leake with a more dependable fifth starter, the Reds have little holes again look like a strong team for 2013. However, its often the little things that matter the most in October, something the Reds were unable to do this year.

         Nasty does not begin to describe the stuff Aroldis Chapman and Craig Kimbrel possess.  The two young fireballers have turned into two of the most dominant relief pitchers in all of baseball.  Notice I said “relief” pitchers, not closers.  Although technically they are perceived as closers, they should not be used in the ninth inning exclusively to “close” out games.  Kimbrel is leading the National League in strikeouts per nine innings (K/9), while Chapman is right behind him at 16.35 K/9 and 15.60 K/9 respectively.  So, if your team has a one run lead in the 7th inning with the bases loaded and 1 out, why would a manager not go to his best strikeout guy? This is because of the save statistic and the fact that closers are defined by how many saves they can record. 

            Nowadays, you see a closer, someone who is generally regarded as the team’s best reliever, come into a game more often when the team has a 3 run lead at the start of the ninth inning.  The amount of pressure in these situations is drastically different.  One way to measure different pressure situations is with leverage index. Leverage index determines the weight of a particular situation due to the inning, score, and outs present at the time. This simplifies pressure-packed or pressure absent at a certain point during the game. For example, the leverage index for a reliever coming in the bottom of the ninth with nobody on and nobody out with a three run lead is 1.0, or in other words, a low leverage situation. On the other hand, a bases loaded, down two, nobody out scenario in the 7th assigns a high leverage number of 4.1. "Firemen" like Chapman and Kimbrel should be used when the pressure is at its highest point in the game. Yes, more often than not, this situation arises before the ninth inning, often representing the turning point of a ball game. However, some teams have done a better job of maximizing their pitcher's ability in pitching higher leverage circumstances. Guys like Fernando Rodney of Tampa Bay and Jim Johnson of Baltimore have emerged as the game’s best relievers and have become poster children for pitching with increased pressure. For example, Johnson leads the league in games entered with high leverage present (leverage index greater than 1.5). On the other hand, Rodney leads all relievers in situational wins saved, a computation of win probability added divided by the leverage index or pressure at a given time. Also, both pitchers rank in the top ten in terms of pitching with high leverage index. In other words, they have pitched the most in pressured packed situations. By maximizing a pitcher's ability and bringing him when the "fire" is its hottest, teams are better able to preserve and secure victories. Again, it is not a coincidence that these teams are either in the playoffs or were in contention until the last week of the season (Tampa Bay).

            Clearly, pitchers that can come in and shutdown a rally or strikeout somebody out when necessary is crucial to any team’s success.  A shutdown or meltdown would be a better way to look at a reliever’s success rather than just look at the save statistic. Shutdowns and meltdowns offer an alternative to the save statistic by simply analyzing whether a pitcher helped or hurt his teams' chances of winning. If a pitcher improved his team's chances of winning by at least 6%, he gets a shutdown. If he hurts his team's chances by 6% or more, then he is awarded a meltdown. This has no silly rules (rule 10.19) to follow and treats all relief pitchers equally (instead of favoring closers like the save statistic implies). Not surprisingly, the aforementioned “closers” have some of the best shutdown ratios in the league (Kimbrel: 37 SD, 4 MD, Chapman: 41 SD, 6 MD, Johnson: 46 SD, 3 MD, Rodney: 34 SD, 2 MD). Yet, even with these excellent numbers, it does not necessarily mean that pitchers are capitalizing on their talent. Would you rather have a middle relief journeyman pitching in a high leverage situation, or a talented flamethrower capable of getting a much needed strikeout? I think the answer is quite obvious and just further illustrates why the current status quo must be changed.

      On a frequent and seemingly every day basis, people often ask me why I think Mike Trout is the American League MVP or why I think he is one of, if not, the best baseball player in the game today. Those same people often observe the modest run batted in totals and decent power numbers and snicker and ridicule me for even putting his name in the same breath as triple crown champion, Miguel Cabrera. Often, people just see a player who put up a very good season, but not a great or extraordinary one by any means. This is where those people are wrong. Mike Trout, known to only the most hardcore of fans, has accomplished an incredible season that is unprecedented both in terms of his age and inexperience in addition to his talent and overall production.            

        Offensively, Mike Trout has blended an incredible mix of power and contact to become a multidimensional threat at the plate. Trout's line of .326/.399/.564 was good enough to rank in the top three for batting average, on base percentage, and slugging percentage. Trout manages to trail only marginally in average and on base with a more significant gap in slugging percentage to sluggers Josh Hamilton and Miguel Cabrera. As for more traditional categories, Trout managed to hit 30 home runs, collect 83 RBI, and score a league leading 129 runs. So far, Trout has yet to lead any of these categories and his offensive prowess seemingly does not match up with the likes of Cabrera, Hamilton, or even Bronx second basemen Robinson Cano. However, when the season is examined completely and to its fullest extent, Trout begins to look more favorably as a hitter. His Offensive WAR (8.6), OPS+ (171), OWn% (.786), WPA (5.3), RE24 (56.5) all lead the league. He is not leading any of those categories by mistake and all point to his extreme value from the batter's box. And to those who do not to want look up the specifics of what each of those statistics mean (which are available in the glossary), the evidence shows that Mike Trout has had among the best offensive production in the league. His offense is quite comparable to Miguel Cabrera from a value standpoint and is essentially a deadlock between the two. Now remember that Trout has posted most of these numbers while being 20 years old (he turned 21 on August 7) and missed the first 20 games of the season while he toyed with minor league pitching (.403/.467/.623 in AAA Salt Lake). To further stress his absurd youth, double-A players have an average age of 22. Furthermore, realize that if he was like any normal 20-21 year old in the majors, he should be struggling against the best pitchers on the planet while trying to survive the everyday grind that is the major league season. Clearly, he has done more than survive this season. However, offense is only one side of the game and the game is influenced by more than just the actions from a rectangle with a chalk exterior. It is these other aspects of the game that allow Trout's star to shine even brighter. 

            On the basepaths, the "Millville Meteor" clearly is a freak, as I say this with the utmost respect and awe. To start, Trout leads all of baseball with 49 stolen bases, three more than Toronto's Rajai Davis. Yet, the risk of getting caught stealing often outweighs the benefit of actually stealing the base. Too many caught stealings are detrimental to an offense, no matter how many bases are successfully stolen. Whereas Davis has a decent 78% success rate, Trout once again excels in this fashion of the game with the highest success rate among those with at least 32 steals (91%). This innate ability to not get thrown out allows for additional opportunities to score and help his team win in a way most ballplayers simply cannot do. Also, Trout is among the top ten in extra bases taken (65%), run scored percentage (44%), and ultimate base running (5.0). His 80 speed on the 20-80 scouting scale additionally allows Trout to reach base on infield singles at an advanced rate, accumulating 25 infield hits this past season. This evidence only further cements Trout's status as one of the most dangerous men in baseball on the base paths. 

            Roaming the pasture of centerfield in Angel Stadium is no easy task, but Mike Trout has looked like a seasoned veteran out in the field. From robbing home runs, to making head-first diving grabs, Trout has been among the most exceptional outfielders in the league. In terms of total zone fielding runs, Trout is third best in the American League among outfielders and also has 2.2 defensive wins above replacement, good for 10th in the entire league. With what cannot be comprehended by the statistics, Trout visibly passes the eye test with his superb jumps and closing speed. Whereas some players' game only offers one dimension, Trout's incredible ability to hit, hit for power, run, field, and throw vaults him to among the best players in the game. Still don't believe my argument for Trout? Just take a look at the Wins Above Replacement leaders for a single season. Notice any of those names? Trout is in company filled with the immortals of the game and the greatest to ever step onto a diamond. For now, forget the MVP. Just realize the greatness of Mike Trout.

Nick Rabasco:     NL Wild Card: Braves over Cardinals
                          AL Wild Card: Orioles over Rangers
                          NL Divison Series: Giants over Reds
                                                       Nationals over Braves
                          AL Division Series: Tigers over A's
                                                       Orioles over Yankees 
                          NL Championship Series: Nationals over Giants
                          AL Championship Series: Tigers over Orioles 
                          World Series: Tigers over Nationals
                          2012 World Champion: Detroit Tigers

Aidan Flynn:    NL Wild Card: Cardinals over Braves 
                        AL Wild Card: Rangers over Orioles
                        NL Division Series: Reds over Giants
                                                      Cardinals over Nationals
                        AL Division Series: Rangers over Yankees 
                                                     Tigers over A's
                        NL Championship Series: Reds over Cardinals 
                        AL Championship Series: Rangers over Tigers
                        World Series: Reds over Rangers 
                        2012 World Champion: Cincinnati Reds